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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TERMINAL SERVICE COMPANY, 
Employer-Petitioner, 
vs. Case No. 20707 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, and RICHARDO 
BURNSIDE, 
Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issue presented in this case is whether the Claimant-
Respondent, Ricardo Burnside, was properly allowed unemployment 
insurance benefits under §35-4-5(b )(1), Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended (Laws of Utah, First Special Session, Ch. 20, 
§3), on the grounds he was not discharged for just cause or for 
an act or omission in connection with employment which was 
-1-
deliberate, willful or wanton and adverse to the employer's 
rightful interests, A second issue presented in this case is 
whether the employer, Terminal Service Company, should be 
relieved of charges for any benefits paid to the Claimant-
Respondent pursuant to §35-4-7(c)(3)(F)(i) , Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended (Utah Legislative Report 1985). 
STATUTES AND RULES OF THE CASE 
§35-4-5(b)(1), UCA, 1953, as amended, provides as follows: 
5, An individual is ineligible for bene-
fits or for purposes of establishing a 
waiting period: 
(b)(1) For the week in which the claimant 
was discharged for just cause or for an act 
or omission in connection with employment, 
not constituting a crime, which is deliber-
ate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the 
employer's rightful interest, if so found 
by the commission, and thereafter until the 
claimant has earned an amount equal to at 
least six times the claimant's weekly bene-
fit amount in bona fide covered employment. 
[The 1983 Legislature changed the designation of §35-4-5(b)(1) 
to 35-4-5(n)(2) . This designation was in error and was correct-
ed by the 1985 Legislature with the passage of Senate Bill 101 
which has redesignated the section as §35-4-5(b)(1), UCA, 1953. 
See Utah Legislative Report 1985.] 
§35-4-7(c)(3)(F)(i) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
(Utah Legislative Report 1985), provides as follows: 
-2-
(F) Social costs shall consist of those 
benefit charges as defined in paragraphs 1, 
2, and 3 below: 
(i) Benefit costs of an individual whose 
base period employer discharged the indi-
vidual or who voluntarily quit employment 
after December 31, 1984, and who would have 
been denied benefits under section 5a or 5b 
under this act but subsequently requalified 
for benefits and actually received bene-
fits, or whose benefits where allowable 
to the employer, will not be charged to the 
employer, but will be considered social 
costs. 
Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(11)-l-A.1., 2., 3. & 4., Depart-
ment of Employment Security Rules and Regulations, provides as 
fo11ows : 
1. When an employee quits his job, there 
is no question that he intended to become 
separated from that employment. The pur-
pose of this section is to deny the benevo-
lent benefits of the statute to individuals 
who bring about their own unemployment by 
conducting themselves, with respect to 
their employment with callousness, misbe-
havior, or lack of consideration to such a 
degree that the employer was justified in 
discharging the employee. However, when an 
employee is discharged by his employer, 
such discharge may have been the result of 
incompetence, lack of skill, or other rea-
sons which are beyond the claimant's con-
trol. The question which must be estab-
lished by the evidence is whether the 
claimant is at fault in his resulting un-
empl oyment. 
2. Unemployment insurance benefits must be 
denied if the employer had just cause for 
discharging the employee. However, not 
eyery cause for discharge provides a basis 
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to deny b e n e f i t s . In order to have just 
cause for d i s c h a r g e p u r s u a n t to Section 3 5 -
4-5(b)(1) there must be some fault on the 
part of the employee i n v o l v e d . 
3. The basic factors which e s t a b l i s h 
f a u l t , and are essential for a d e t e r m i n a -
tion of i n e l i g i b i l i t y under the d e f i n i t i o n 
of just cause a r e : 
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showing that the employee had knowledge of 
the expected conduct. After the employee 
is given a warning he should be given an 
opportunity to correct objectionable con-
duct. Additional violations occurring 
after the warning would be necessary to 
establish just cause for a discharge. 
c. Control 
The conduct must have been within the power 
and capacity of the claimant to control or 
prevent. 
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Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(11)-1.B . 2 . , Department of Employ-
ment Security Rules and Regulations, provides as follows: 
B.2. In a discharge, the employer initi-
ates the separation and, as such, is the 
primary source of information with regard 
to the reasons for the dismissal. The 
employer has the responsibility to estab-
lish the facts resulting in the discharge. 
The employer is required by the Statute in 
Section 35 -4-11 (g) to keep accurate records 
and to provide correct information to the 
Department for proper administration of the 
Act. Although the employer has the burden 
-5-
to establish just cause for the discharge, 
if sufficient facts are obtained from the 
claimant, a decision will be made based on 
the information available. The failure of 
one party to provide information does not 
automatically result in a ruling favorable 
to the other party. 
Proposed Rule A71-07-1;7( 111) D . 1. , Department of Employment 
Security Rules and Regulations, provides as follows: 
1. Written Request Required for Relief of 
Charges 
a. The employer may be eligible for relief 
of charges when a protest has been submit-
ted in writing within the ten-day time lim-
itation as prescribed by §35-4-7(c)(3)(E) 
of the Act if: 
(3) the claimant was discharged from that 
employer for circumstances which would have 
resulted in a denial of benefits under §35-
4-5(b) of the Act; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah pursuant to §35-4-10(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, seeking 
judicial review of the decision of the Board of Review, Indus-
trial Commission of Utah, dated May 7, 1985, Case No. 85-BR-122 
(See Appendix A ) , which reversed the decision of the Administra-
tive Law Judge dated February 15, 1985, Case No. 85-A-361, (See 
Appendix B). The decision of the Board of Review held that 
the Claimant-Respondent, Ricardo Burnside, was eligible for 
unemployment benefits pursuant to §35-4-5(b)(1), Utah Code 
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Annotated, 1953, as amended, on the grounds he was not discharg-
ed from employment for disqualifying reasons, and held the 
employer, Terminal Service Company, liable for benefit charges 
in connection with this claim pursuant to §35-4-7(c)(3)(F) (i ) , 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended (Utah Legislative Report 
1985), and Proposed Rule A71-07-1:7(111)D. 1. , Department of 
Employment Security Rules and Regulations. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents are in substantial agreement with Employer-
Petitioner's Statement of Facts- However, Respondents feel it 
is necessary to clarify certain particulars referred to in 
Petitioner's Statement of Facts and to add certain items not 
referred to by Petitioner (hereinafter referred to as "employ-
er" or "Terminal") as follows: There is no evidence in the 
record of a specific verbal policy to the effect that if an 
employee failed to notify the employer that he was going to be 
absent that it would constitute grounds for discharge. How-
ever, regardless of whether or not there was such a verbal 
understanding, Claimant-Respondent (hereinafter referred to as 
"claimant") testified that he always called in to report to the 
employer if he were going to be late or absent. R.0056,0058 
(See Appendix C for all pages of the record referred to in this 
Brief.) The employer representative testified a good percent 
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of the time claimant wouldn't call to report absences. R.0044 
The only other evidence that the claimant failed to call in on 
an occasion when he was absent was the testimony of the employer 
representative that the claimant failed to call in to report 
his absence on the Sunday in question. R.0065 But the Admin-
istrative Law Judge and the Board of Review found to the con-
trary that the claimant did call in on that date. On p. 11 of 
its Brief, Employer-Petitioner indicates it is not asking the 
Court to examine or overrule that finding. 
With respect to tardiness claimant acknowledged that he 
was tardy during the first or second week of his employment but 
at that point he discussed the matter with his boss and got it 
straightened out and was not tardy after that. R.0055 
The employer representative testified that the claimant 
was told several times that if he did not come into work he 
would be let go. Claimant denied being given such a warning. 
R.0057 
The warning given to the claimant on December 2, the week 
before the week in question, applied only to that particular 
Sunday and was not a directive that claimant work all Sundays 
thereafter or be fired. R.0049 
During the time period of claimant's employment there was 
no written policy and procedure manual available for the guid-
ance and instruction of the claimant and other employees. 
-8-
R.Q048 No written warning regarding attendance or tardiness 
violations was ever given to the claimant. R.0052 The employ-
er at the hearing did not document or detail as to the date and 
time the occasions when the claimant was allegedly absent or 
tardy with or without permission, or the specific dates and 
manner in which the claimant was allegedly given warning regard-
ing attendance. R.0052 
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On Sunday, December 2, 1984 when the claimant asked the 
supervisor for a day off and was told to either work or lose 
his job, another employee took that day off and nothing was 
said to that employee. R.0049 On the Monday in question, 
December 1 0, 1984, another employee did not come into work but 
he was not fired. R.0055 Other employees have taken days off 
without even calling in and nothing was said to them. R.0056 
The claimant always called in to report if he was going to be 
-9-
late or not going to be in. R.0056,0058 The usual crew claim-
ant worked with consisted of four men. On two Sundays the 
claimant worked all day with just one other man when two mem-
bers of the crew did not call in and did not show up. They 
were not discharged. R.0058 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court has consistently held that the Commission's 
findings of fact are conclusive, binding on the Court and will 
be sustained if supported by competent and substantial evidence 
in the record. The question of whether a claimant's actions 
are disqualifying as misconduct under the Employment Security 
Act involves those intermediate types of issues, i.e., that the 
decision of the Board of Review must fall within the limits of 
reasonableness or rationality as measured by the statutory 
language purpose and policy. 
Prior to the amendment in 1983 of the misconduct provi-
sion of the Employment Security Act, this Court in interpreting 
said section held it was not necessary that an employee intend 
to cause harm to his employer to impose a disqualification. 
The Court held it is sufficient that his acts be volitional, 
the consequences of his acts be foreseeable and that the acts 
be sufficiently culpable to justify preclusion of benefits. 
Said criteria have been incorporated into the Department Rules 
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quoted herein interpreting the just cause provision added to 
the misconduct section in 1983. This Court has held that a 
warning is necessary in absenteeism and tardiness cases. Claim-
ant was not given adequate warning to satisfy the knowledge 
factor and justify a denial of benefits. In any event the deci-
sion of the Commission in this regard does not fall outside the 
limits of reasonableness or rationality. 
In order for the Commission to assess a disqualification 
under the misconduct provision of the law there must be a show-
ing of a knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly en-
forced rule of an employer. If an employer's expectations are 
unclear, ambiguous or inconsistent or not uniformly enforced, 
the existence of knowledge is not shown. In the instant case 
the rules of the employer were not uniformly enforced and were 
unclear, ambiguous and inconsistent. 
Prior to the amendment of the law to add the just cause 
provision in 1983 this Court held that in order to satisfy the 
culpability requirement an employee's actions must be deliberate 
and willful in the sense that they were volitional acts by an 
individual who could not have been heedless of their consequen-
ces. The acts must be sufficiently serious to involve the de-
gree of culpability impliedly required by the statute. The 
proposed Rule of the Department of Employment Security defining 
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culpability and misconduct as required by the statute, includ-
ing the 1983 amendments, has to a large extent incorporated and 
adopted the prior rulings of this Court. The acts of miscon-
duct in cases before this Court in which benefits were denied 
were \/ery serious in comparison to the actions alleged to 
constitute misconduct in the instant case. The decision of 
the Board of Review in the instant case that claimant's conduct 
was not sufficiently culpable to warrant a denial of benefits 
is supported by the former decisions of this Court and falls 
well within the limits of reasonableness or rationality. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN REVIEWING A DETERMINATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
ACT THE COURT WILL AFFIRM THE COMMISSION'S FIND-
INGS IF SUCH ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPE-
TENT EVIDENCE. 
The standard of review in unemployment insurance cases is 
well established. §35-4-10(i), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides in pertinent part: 
In any judicial proceeding under this sec-
tion the findings of the Commission and the 
Board of Review as to the facts if support-
ed by evidence, shall be conclusive and the 
jurisdiction of said Court shall be con-
fined to questions of law. 
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This Court has consistently held that the Commission's 
findings of fact are conclusive, binding on this Court, and 
to be sustained if supported by competent and substantial evi-
dence in the record. Martinez v. Board of Review, 2 5 U.2d 131, 
477 P.2d 587 (1970); Whitney v. Board of Review of Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Utah, 585 P.2d 780 (19/8). In the case of 
Salt Lake City Corporation v . Department of Employment Secu-
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In determining whether a claimant's misconduct is disqual-
ifying as a misconduct under the Employment Security Act, this 
Court has held that it will review the Department's interpreta-
tion of operative provisions of its governing legislation and 
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its application of those legal rules to the facts of the case. 
CI earfield City v. Department of Employment Security, Utah, 663 
P.2d 440 (1983). As to either of those functions, the Court 
will review the Agency's decision to see whether it falls "with-
in the limits of reasonableness or rationality." Utah Depart-
ment of Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, 
Utah, 658 P.2d 601, 609-612 (1983); City of Orem v. Christensen, 
Utah, 682 P.2d 292 (1984). This Court has stated "We will 
affirm the Board's decision unless, as a matter of law, the 
determination was wrong because only the opposite conclusion 
could be drawn from the facts." J_d. , at 293; See also Conti-
nental Oil Co. v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 
Utah, 568 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1977). 
This Court has previously held that "[N]ot eyery cause for 
discharge provides a basis to deny eligibility for unemployment 
compensation." Clearfield City v. Department of Employment Se-
curity, supra, at 441. Disqualification does not apply where 
the evidence shows the discharge was due to inefficiency, un-
satisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result 
of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negli-
gence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment 
or discretion. See Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Review of 
the Industrial Commission, supra, at 730. 
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POINT II 
THE CONCLUSION OF LAW OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW --
THAT THE CLAIMANT'S FAILURE TO REPORT FOR WORK 
ON THE SUNDAY AND MONDAY IN QUESTION WAS NOT 
SUCH CONDUCT AS TO WARRANT A DISQUALIFICATION 
FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS -- FALLS 
WELL WITHIN THE STANDARD OF REVIEW OF DECISIONS 
OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IN THESE INTERMEDIATE 
TYPES OF ISSUES, i.e., THAT THE DECISION OF THE 
COMMISSION MUST FALL WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REA-
SONABLENESS OR RATIONALITY AS MEASURED BY THE 
STATUTORY LANGUAGE, PURPOSE AND POLICY. THE 
"KNOWLEDGE FACTOR" NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH FAULT 
AND ESSENTIAL FOR A DETERMINATION OF INELIGIBIL-
ITY FOR MISCONDUCT UNDER §35-4-5(b )(1), UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, HAS NOT BEEN 
SATISFIED. 
The Board of Review concluded that the claimant was not 
discharged for just cause or for an act or omission which is 
deliberate, willful or wanton and adverse to the employer's 
rightful interests, per §35-4-5(b)(1) of the Act. The issue is 
whether or not claimant's absenteeism and/or tardiness was of 
such nature that it satisfied the just cause or deliberate, 
willful or wanton and adverse to employer's rightful interests 
standards of the Act so as to justify a denial of unemployment 
benef its. 
This Court recently interpreted the "just cause" standard 
of §5 (b) (1) for the first time in Kehl v. Board of Review of 
Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of Employment Securi-
ty_, Utah, 700 P.?d 1129 (1985). The Court considered proposed 
Rule A71-07-1:5(1I)-l, Department of Employment Security Rules 
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and Regulations relating to "just cause" and held that "The 
proposed Rules and Regulations are within the limits of reason-
ableness and rationality." See Rule A71-07-1:5(11)-l.A, quoted 
in full supra in the Statutes and Rules of the Case. 
During the time period of claimant's employ by Terminal, 
there was no written policy and procedure manual available for 
the guidance and instruction of the claimant and other employ-
ees. R.0048 There was an indefinite, informal verbal under-
standing in effect, relating to attendance and tardiness. 
R.0048,0049 It was informally understood that an employee 
must call in and let the employer know if he was not going to 
be in to work on a particular day. R.0042 It was also inform-
ally understood that in order to get a day off from work an 
employee must request^ permi Lyl2il^^atwl£^^t._9X?_ d ?y in advance. 
R.Q049_ 
Employer-Petitioner in its appeal to the Supreme Court does 
not dispute the Board of Review's finding of fact that the 
claimant telephoned the employer on the Sunday in question 
shortly before the time he was scheduled to start work to inform 
the employer that he would not be in to work on said Sunday. It 
is also not disputed that the claimant also informed the employer 
on the Monday in question that his truck had broken down and 
that he would not be able to come into work until he had taken 
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care of his truck. The claimant's girlfriend relayed the mes-
sage to the employer at the request of the claimant shortly 
before the time the claimant was scheduled to start work on 
the Monday in question. 
In the case of Trotta v. Department of Employment Security, 
Utah, 664 P.2d 1194 (1983), this Court considered absenteeism 
and tardiness as a basis for a denial of benefits under §5(b)(1) 
of the Act before amendment of said section to add the "just 
cause" standard. 1983 Utah Laws, First Special Session, Ch. 20, 
§3 (Appendix D ) . In the Trotta decision the Court stated that 
in order to impose a disqualification for misconduct an employee 
need not intend to cause harm to his employer. "It is suffi-
cient that his acts be volitional, the consequences of his acts 
be foreseeable, and that the acts be sufficiently culpable to 
justify preclusion of benefits." It is submitted tnat said 
criteria have been incorporated into the Rules quoted above in-
terpreting the "just cause" provision added to §5(b)(1), the 
misconduct section of the Act. The volitional criteria is 
basically the same as the control factor in the above-quoted 
proposed Rules. The foreseeabi1ity of the consequences of 
his acts criteria is basically the same as the knowledge factor 
of the new Rules and the sufficiently culpable criteria of 
Trotta is basically the same as the culpability factor of the 
proposed Rule. 
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Rule A71-07-1:5(11) -1 .A.4. of the Department of Employment 
Security Rules and Regulations provides as follows 
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One important test in the instant case is the foreseeabil-
ity of consequences criteria enunciated in Trotta, referred to 
as the "knowledge factor" to establish fault in the proposed 
Rules of the Department of Employment Security. 
A. WARNING 
The necessity of a warning in absenteeism and tardiness 
cases is set forth in Trotta v. Department of Employment Secu-
rity, supra, as follows 
. . . cases usually fall into two categor-
ies: frequent absences and single absen-
ces. See Annot., 58 A.L.R.Sd 674, §§6, 7 
(1974). Generally, in frequent absenteeism 
cases, benefits are not precluded for un-
excused absences unless the employee was 
warned that continued absences would lead 
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was decided under a misconduct standard 
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tory standard, this Court sustained a deni-
al of benefits for frequent absences on the 
grounds that 
[hjaving been cautioned . . . with re-
spect to [his absences], the claimant 
knew that failure to report for work 
. . . would result in his discharge, 
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demonstrated a disregard for the best 
interest of the employer [so] as to 
constitute misconduct connected with 
his work. 
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No written warning regarding attendance or tardiness vio-
lations was ever given to the claimant. R.0052 The employer 
at the hearing did not document or detail as to date and time 
the occasions when the claimant was allegedly absent or tardy 
with or without permission or the specific dates and manner in 
which claimant was allegedly given warning as to the consequen-
ces of a failure to comply with company rules pertaining to 
attendance or tardiness. R.0052 The employer vaguely and 
without specificity testified that claimant was told several 
times if he did not come to work he would be let go. R.0042 
Claimant's testimony was to the contrary. 
JUDGE: Do you recall being warned that 
if you failed to appear for work 
at the requested time --
CLAIMANT: No, no. 
JUDGE: -- that you'd be fired? 
CLAIMANT: No. 
JUDGE: Or that you could be fired? 
CLAIMANT: No. 
JUDGE: Do you recall anyone? 
CLAIMANT: Just that when he said he would 
fire me that Sunday, and I came 
in that Sunday. 
JUDGE: That was the 2nd, that was the 
Sunday before, right? 
-20-
CLAIMANT: Yes, the Sunday before, right. 
That's why I wanted to take the 
Sunday off for to get my truck 
together. . . . (R.0057) 
It is not disputed that sometime prior to the Sunday and 
Monday in question the employer told the claimant that if his 
truck was not running the employer would arrange to have him 
picked up. R.0042,0046 It is also undisputed that no such 
offer was made by the employer to the claimant on the Sunday 
and Monday in question. R.0053 
B. KNOWLEDGE OF CONDUCT EXPECTED 
In Kehl v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission of 
Utah, Department of Employment Security, supra, at p. 7, the 
Court held that the determination as to whether or not the 
claimant had knowledge of the conduct expected of her was a 
finding of fact and that the findings of the Commission that 
Petitioner knowingly violated the rule were findings of fact 
which this Court will not overturn: 
. . . unless they are clearly arbitrary and 
capricious. Salt Lake City Corporation v. 
Department of Employment Security, Utah, 
657 P.2d —TIT2 (1982) . 
It would appear that there is an implied finding of fact by the 
Board of Review that the claimant did not have knowledge that 
his failure to attend at work on the Sunday in question was 
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unexcused. There appears to be an implied finding of fact by 
the Board that the claimant did not know that his request for 
the day off had been turned down and that he was under instruc-
tion to come into work. The record shows that the claimant and 
three other employees took turns having Sunday off. R.0057 
Since the claimant had been turned down the Sunday before, he 
reasonably could have expected that it was his turn on the 
Sunday in question to have the day off. The employer makes 
an emphatic point of the employer's willingness to go to the 
claimant's home and pick him up in case the claimant should 
be without transportation. The claimant resided at 264 South 
1530 West and performed his services for the employer at 
2551 South 800 West in Salt Lake City. The distance between 
was approximately 30 blocks. The claimant reasonably could 
have expected that the employer would send transportation to 
pick up the claimant and take him to work on the Sunday in 
question if he were needed and the employer found it necessary 
to deny his request to have the day off. 
Also with respect to the next day, the Monday in question, 
it would appear that there is an implied finding of fact by the 
Board of Review that the claimant did not have knowledge of the 
conduct the employer expected of him, i.e., that he should come 
into work even though he was in a situation where he was under 
-22-
an obligation to move his truck which had broken down to a 
location out of the way of other drivers. The claimant had 
found it necessary to miss work the preceding day and to forego 
the wages which he would have earned to make necessary repairs 
on his truck. Now when the truck broke down again on the Mon- I 
day the claimant apparently felt he was under compulsion analo-
gous to illness to get the truck repaired so as to avoid contin-
ual day-to-day uncertainty as to whether he would have reliable 
transportation to transport him and his girlfriend back and forth 
to work* 
Claimant was further reassured that the employer acceded 
to his request for time off on the Monday in question by the 
fact that at the time the claimant's girlfriend called in to 
report to the employer that the claimant's truck had broken 
down, the supervisor, Crapo, simply said "Okay." R.0043 When 
the claimant's girlfriend reported to him that the manager 
had told her "Okay" the claimant reasonably could have inter-
preted the response to mean the employer had no objection to 
claimant's taking what time was necessary that day to correct 
the problems with his truck. A person in claimant's situation 
reasonably could have expected if it was not okay that an 
employer would have responded it would cause the employer 
problems if the employee did not come into work and instructed 
the employee to take care of what was absolutely necessary and 
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then come on into work as soon as possible. For instance in 
the instant case the employer reasonably should have instructed 
the claimant to move his truck out of the way and park it some-
where on tne side of the road or in a parking lot, etc. where 
it would not inconvenience anyone and then immediately come on 
in to work. 
C. DISCRIMINATION 
The decision in the case of Kehl v. Board of Review of 
Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of Employment Securi-
ty, supra, p. 3, quotes from the Indiana Code the definition of 
discharge for just cause as including a "knowing violation of a 
reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of an employer." (Empha-
sis added) The proposed Rules of the Department provide under 
the explanation of the knowledge factor: "If the employer's 
expectations are unclear, ambiguous or i neons i stent, the exist-
ence of knowledge is not shown. . . ." (Emphasis added) On 
p. 4 of the Kehl decision the Court refers to an Ohio case 
of Harp v. Admini strator, 230 N.E.2d 376 (1976). In commenting 
on the case this Court stated: 
Although the court found that the employee 
was not discharged for just cause within 
the meaning of the statute, it did so be-
cause it found that the employer did not 
enforce the rule fair!yT" (Emphasis added) 
-24-
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In the instant case there is substantial evidence in the 
record that the employer's expectations were unclear, ambiguous 
or inconsistent and the rules were not uniformly enforced. 
Therefore, the existence of the knowledge factor is not shown. 
Other employees were allowed to take Sundays off without any-
thing being said to them whereas when the claimant asked the 
supervisor for a day off the claimant was told that if he didn't 
come to work on that particular Sunday "then don't come back 
there anymore." R.0049 On the Monday in question, December 10, 
1984, another employee did not come into work but he was not 
fired. R.0055 The other man's name was Madison or Masterson. 
Other employees have taken days off without even calling in and 
nothing was said to them. R.0056 Claimant testified he always 
called in to report if he was going to be late or not going to 
be in. R.0056 The employer testified that he did not always 
call in. R.0044 On at least three occasions the claimant work-
ed with less than a full crew. The usual crew is four men and 
on those occasions claimant worked with just one other man--two 
men on the crew did not show up. On two Sundays claimant work-
ed all day with just one other man. Two members of the crew 
did not call in and did not show up. They were not discharged. 
R.0058 This was not disputed by the employer. R.0058 Inasmuch 
as the claimant had on occasion been required to work on a 
short-handed basis because other employees had not shown up for 
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work, it was not unreasonable for the claimant to conclude that 
if he could carry on and get the work done when others did not 
show up that others could do the same on the occasion when he 
did not come into work. Where as here the attendance rules were 
not uniformly enforced and claimant was treated differently from 
certain other employees, the claimant's actions on the days in 
question were not unreasonable and the existence of the knowl-
edge factor essential for a determination of ineligibility has 
not been shown . 
POINT III 
THE CONDUCT OF THE CLAIMANT WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY 
SERIOUS TO INVOLVE THE DEGREE OF CULPABILITY RE-
QUIRED BY THE STATUTE AS DEFINED BY THIS COURT 
AND DEPARTMENT PROPOSED RULES SO AS TO CAUSE A 
DENIAL OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS. 
The three basic factors which establish fault and are es-
sential for a determination of ineligibility under §5(b)(1) of 
the Act are: culpability, knowledge and control. The culpa-
bility factor is defined in Rule A71-07-1:5(11)-1.A.3.a. of the 
proposed Rules of the Department of Employment Security as fol-
lows: 
a . Culpabi1i ty 
This is the seriousness of the conduct as 
it affects continuance of the employment 
relationship. The discharge must have been 
necessary to avoid actual or potential harm 
to the employer's rightful interests. A 
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discharge would not be considered "neces-
sary" if it is not consistent with reason-
able employment practices. The wrongness 
of the conduct must be considered in the 
context of the particular employment and 
how it affects the employer's rights. If 
the conduct was an isolated incident of 
poor judgement and there is no expectation 
that the conduct will be continued or re-
peated, potential harm may not be shown and 
therefore it is not necessary to discharge 
the em pioyee. 
In tne case of Clearfield City v. Department of Employment 
Security, supra, the Court addressed and defined the culpability 
factor. The Court held that the acts of misconduct in the 
CI earf iel d case were deliberate and willful in the sense that 
they were volitional acts by an employee who could not have been 
heedless of their consequences. The Court went on: 
It only remains to determine whether those 
acts were sufficiently serious to involve 
the degree of culpability that the depart-
ment concluded (reasonably, in our view) 
was impliedly required by this statute. 
The Court adopted the language from a Maryland case, Employment 
Security Board v. LeCates, 145 A.2d 844 (1958) that "The impor-
tant element to be considered is the nature of the misconduct 
and how seriously it affects the claimant's employment or the 
employer's r ights." 
The proposed rule of the Department of Employment Security 
quoted above defining culpability is in large part taken from 
the Clearfield decision. An examination of the rule and the 
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decision reveals that the following language of the decision has 
basically been incorporated into the rule defining culpability: 
. . . whether those acts were sufficiently 
serious to involve the degree of culpabil-
ity . . . 
. • . the wrongness of the conduct must be 
judged in the particular employment con-
I t A L • • • • 
. . . how s e r i o u s l y i t a f f e c t s the c l a i m -
a n t ' s employment or the e m p l o y e r ' s r i g h t s . 
. . . the employee's suitability to contin-
ue as a supervisor. . . . 
A review of the Utah Supreme Court cases which have con-
sidered the seriousness to have involved the degree of culpa-
bility necessary to cause a denial of benefits is hereafter 
submitted by way of a comparison to the facts in the instant 
case. 
In the case of Clearfield City v. Department of Employment 
Secur i ty, supra, the Court held that the claimant's act of 
sodomy and then his initial denial that it had occurred had a 
serious effect on the claimant's employment and upon the em-
ployer's rightful interests. 
The act of sodomy violated the laws the 
officer and his employer had a sworn duty 
to uphold and enforce. It occurred within 
the limits of the city where he was on call 
24 hours a day as a police officer. It was 
also a violation of the terms of his part-
time employment, which resulted in his dis-
charge by an institution with which he 
-28-
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It would appear that the acts of misconduct in CIearfield were 
yery serious in comparison to the actions alleged to constitute 
misconduct in the instant case. 
In the case of Kehl v. Board of Review of Industrial Com-
mission, Department of Employment Security, supra, the Court 
also considered whether the acts were sufficiently serious to 
involve the degree of culpability required by the statute. 
According to the rule, a discharge is not 
necessary "if it is not consistent with 
reasonable employment practices," and 
"[t]he wrongness of the conduct must be 
considered in context of the particular 
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employment and how it affects the employ-
er's rights. 
As mentioned above, the motors the peti-
tioner was moving contained up to 10,000 
pounds of explosives, and the trains and 
trolleys using the track the petitioner had 
to cross in moving the motors often travel-
ed in groups of up to five. The petition-
er's awareness that one train had passed 
the crossing in no way assured that there 
were no more following. Indeed, it might 
well have been an indication to the con-
trary. The facts of this case meet the 
culpability requirement because the wrong-
ness of the conduct, when viewed in the 
context of the employment and the poten-
tially devastating effects on the employ-
er's rights, was severe and because the 
discharge was necessary to avoid the poten-
tial harm to the employer's interests that 
another violation could cause. 
The seriousness of the conduct and the potential devastating 
effects involving 10,000 pounds of explosives being carried 
across railroad tracks was severe and without question in 
comparison to the facts regarding alleged misconduct in the 
instant case. 
In the case of Januz i k v. Department of Employment Secu-
rity and Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 
supra, the issue was absenteeism and tardiness similar to the 
instant case. However, the cases are wery clearly distinguish-
able. The Appeal Referee in Januzik found in his findings of 
fact that: 
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2. That the claimant was absent from work 
April 27, 1976, and failed to call the em-
ployer to report his absence. On April 28, 
1976, he called the employer informing him 
that he would be absent that day and re-
questing also the following day off to take 
care of personal business. On Sunday, 
May 2, 1976, the employer completed an em-
ployee notice which was read and signed by 
the claimant on May 2, 1976, and which 
states: 
"James you have been absent many times dur-
ing this last year. On several of these 
absences you have not called in to report 
your being off. You were told when hired 
that this is a must. Bobby Wood has told 
you repeatedly that you must call in when 
absent." 
"I feel it is now time to put you on writ-
ten notice. If you are late or absent one 
(1) time during the next two (2) months it 
will be an automatic termination. If you 
do come to work regular during this period 
of time and fail to call in when absent in 
the future it will be an automatic termina-
tion." 
A yery specific written notice was given to the claimant in the 
Januzi k case in which the emphasis was that claimant had been 
absent without calling in to inform the employer. In the in-
stant case there is no comparable specific written or verbal 
notice and the evidence is that the claimant in the instant case 
always called in to report absences. In his comments in the 
decision in Januzik, the Appeals Referee stated: 
In the instant case, it would appear that 
the claimant had been absent on several 
occasions without properly notifying the 
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employer that he would be absent from work. 
The employer's request that claimant notify 
the employer when he expected to be absent 
from work was not an unreasonable one, and 
it would appear the employer has the right 
to be informed of such absences to allow 
him an opportunity to obtain a replacement 
or make arrangements necessary to accomp-
lish the work within the allotted time. 
Again the emphasis of the Referee in Januzik was failure of the 
claimant to call in and report that he would be absent from 
work. In the instant case no such element is present. In the 
Januzik case the Appeal Referee further states in his comments 
that: 
The record shows that, although the claim-
ant did call at 11:00 p.m. on the evening 
of May 5, he did so merely to report that 
he would be one hour late for work; in-
stead, he failed to report for his shift 
at all. Having been cautioned on May 2, 
1976, with respect to this matter, the 
claimant knew that failure to report for 
work on May 5, 1976, would result in his 
discharge, . . . 
(See Appendix E for complete decision of ALJ in Januzik case.) 
In Januzi k a wery certain, clear and unambiguous written notice 
was given three days prior to the absence which resulted in the 
discharge. There is nothing comparable in the instant case in 
respect to a yery specific notice and unquestioned knowledge on 
the part of the claimant that his failure to report for work on 
the Sunday and Monday in question would result in his discharge. 
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In the case of City of Orem v. Christensen, supra, the 
employer gave the claimant a notice of dismissal which listed 
unexcused absences and tardiness and conducting of personal 
business on company time as the basis for the discharge. The 
Court upheld the decision of the Board of Review that claim-
ant's conduct was not sufficiently culpable to cause a denial 
of benefits. 
On May 13, 1983, Christensen was notified 
of his suspension and dismissal effective 
May 18, 1983. The notice listed several 
instances of unexcused absences, tardiness 
and his conducting personal business on 
company time. . . . 
In Clearfield, we determined that in order 
to preclude benefits, the claimant's acts 
must not only be deliberate and willful but 
must also be "sufficiently serious to meet 
the statutory degree of culpability." Id. 
at 445. In that case we found the degree 
of culpability in the fact that "[t]he 
nature of the acts of misconduct . . . was 
such as to have a serious effect on claim-
ant's employment and the employer's inter-
ests." Id. We cautioned that the conduct 
must be judged in the particular employment 
context. Id. at 444-445. 
Under the circumstances, we conclude that 
the Board's decision that claimant's con-
duct was not sufficiently culpable to deny 
him benefits falls within the limits of 
reasonableness or rationality. 
In the case of Western Dairymen Cooperative, Inc. v. Board 
of Review of Industrial Commission of Utah, Utah, 684 P.2d 647 
(1984), the Court considered the culpability factor in respect 
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interests. Such factors are completely absent in the instant 
case. 
It is submitted that the decision of the Board of Review 
that claimant's conduct was not sufficiently culpable to require 
a denial of benefits falls within the limits of reasonableness 
or rationality (See Point I above), and that it should, there-
fore, be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The claimant's failure to report for work on the Sunday and 
Monday in question under all of the circumstances disclosed in 
the record was not such conduct as to require a disqualification 
for unemployment benefits. Neither the knowledge factor nor the 
culpability factor necessary to establish fault and essential 
for a determination of ineligibility for misconduct under §35-4-
5(b)(1) has been satisfied. 
The claimant was not given adequate warning, necessary in 
absenteeism and tardiness cases, to justify a denial of bene-
fits. The employer's expectations were unclear, inconsistent 
and not uniformly enforced. The claimant was treated different-
ly than other employees. Such being the case, pursuant to 
Department proposed Rules, the knowledge factor was not satis-
fied. 
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The actions alleged to constitute misconduct in this case 
are not comparable to the acts held to be disqualifying miscon-
duct in prior decisions of this Court. The decision of the 
Board of Review that claimant's actions did not rise to that 
level of culpability necessary to impose a disqualification is 
in accord with the evidence and the former decisions of this 
Court; it falls within the limits of reasonableness and ration-
ality as that standard of review has been defined by this Court. 
The employer, Terminal Service Company, is not eligible for 
relief of charges for benefits paid to the claimant under the 
statutes and proposed Department Rules because claimant was not 
discharged by the employer for actions which were disqualifying. 
The decision of the Board of Review should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of September, 1985. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
K. ALLAN ZABEL 
WINSTON M. FAUX 
Special Assi stants 
Attorney General 
By 
Winston W. Faux 
Spec i al Assi stant 
Attorney General 
-36-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed four copies of the fore-
going Respondents' Brief, postage prepaid, to the following: 
David R. Money, esq., JONES, WALDO, H0LBR00K & McDONOUGH, Attor-
neys for the Employer-Petitioner, Terminal Service Company, 
1500 First Interstate Plaza, 170 South Main Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101; and Ricardo Burnside, Claimant-Respondent, 
264 South Foss #59, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, this 23rd day 
of September, 1985. 
BOARD OF REVIEW APPENDIX A 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Unemployment Compensation Appeals 
RICARDO BURNSIDE 
S.S.A. No. 364 58 S849 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
Case No. 85-A-361 
DECISION 
Case No. 85-BR-122 
After careful consideration of the record and testimony 1n the 
above-entitled matter, the Board of Review hereby reverses the decision of 
the Administrative Law Judge which denied benefits to the claimant effective 
December 9, 1984, and continuing, on the grounds he was discharged from 
his employment for conduct which is disqualifying under the provisions 
of S35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act; and relieved the 
employer, Terminal Service Company, for charges 1n connection with this 
claim. Benefits are allowed to the claimant effective December 9, 1984, 
and continuing, provided he 1s otherwise elglble, on the grounds he was 
discharged from his employment but not for conduct which 1s disqualifying 
under the provisions of $35-4-5(b)(l) of the Act. The employer, Terminal 
Service Company, 1s held liable for benefit charges In connection with 
this claim. 
In reversing the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, the 
Board of Review finds the testimony that the claimant did not call In on 
Sunday was not credible. Moreover, the employer had not documented the 
claimant's past tardies or absences or Its warnings to the claimant that 
he would be terminated in the event he was again absent or tardy. The 
claimant testified that other employees were allowed to be absent without 
similar disciplinary actions being taken against them. Under such circum-
stances, the Board of Review concludes the claimant's actions did not rise 
to that level of culpability necessary to Impose a disqualification. 
This decision will become final ten days after the date of mailing 
hereof and any further appeal must be made directly with the Utah Supreme 
Court at the State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, within ten days 
after this decision becomes final. To file an appeal with the Supreme 
Court you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ of 
Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to $35-4-10(1) of 
the Utah Employment Security Act, followed by a Docketing Statement and a 
Legal Brief. 
BOARD OF R| 
Dated this 7th day of May, 1985. 
Date Mailed: May 10, 1985. 
Remailed: May 29, 1985 to Ricardo B ide, General Del^yery, Salt Lake Ci ty , UT 8411 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAh 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
Appeals Section 
Decision of Administrative Law Judge 
APPENDIX B (Page 1) 
Rlcardo Burnslde 
264 South Foss #59 
Salt Lake City, UT 84104 
S.S.A. No. 
Case No. 
364-58-5849 
85-A-361 
APPEAL FILED: January 17, 1985 
APPEARANCES: Claimant and employer 
DATE OF HEARING: February 7, 1985 
PLACE OF HEARING: SLC/Telephone 
The Department's decision dated January 4f 1985 denied unemployment Insurance 
benefits effective December 9, 1984 and continuing, on the grounds that the claim-
ant was discharged from employment for just cause or misconduct as defined by 
§35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act. §35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act and §A71-07-l:7(III) of the Rules, Regulations and Guide 
to Adjudication of the Utah Department of Employment Security are quoted on the 
attached sheets. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Prior to filing his claim for unemployment insurance benefits effective December 9, 
1984, the claimant was last employed full time from February 27 to December 10, 1984 
by Terminal Service Company at its plant in Salt Lake City, Utah, installing truck 
bumpers and performing pick-up and delivery services. At the commencement of his 
employment, the claimant was informed that he would be expected to work six days a 
week, including most Sundays. 
The employer's policy requires that if an employee 1s unable to report for work, 
he or she must promptly notify the employer by telephone. Because the claimant 
was found to be "continually tardy" by the employer, the employer had offered to 
provide transportation to bring the claimant to work from home if he lacked tran-
sporation. According to the employer, such policies are based on a "verbal 
understanding" with the employees, as there is no written document evidencing 
same. Although no written warning was issued to the claimant, he had been verbally 
cautioned that his attendance at work, particularly 1n times of heavy business 
activity, was crucial to the company and unjustified nonattendance could result 
in discharge. The claimant had requested leave from work for Sunday, December 2, 
1984, but was denied with an oral admonition from his supervisor that if he did 
not appear for work on that day he would be discharged. 
The following Sunday, December 9, 1984, the claimant was scheduled to work beginning 
at 8:00 a.m. The claimant telephoned the office and spoke with a fellow employee 
at approximately 7:45 a.m. and left a message for his supervisor that he would not 
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Ricardo Burnside - 2 - 364-58-5849 
85-A-361 
be present for work that day. However, the message was not transmitted to the 
supervisor. The following day, the claimant had problems with his vehicle and 
was unable to drive to work. At the claimant's request, his girlfriend notified 
the employer that the claimant was unable to report for work. The claimant's then 
acting supervisor, with whom the girlfriend spoke, simply responded "Okay". The 
claimant did not request transportation from the employer or otherwise directly 
communicate with the employer. 
The following day, Tuesday, December 11, the claimant reported for work and was 
thereupon discharged due to repeated tardiness and failure to report for work when 
scheduled. 
REASONING AND CONCLUSION OF LAW: 
535-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act provides that a claimant for 
unemployment Insurance benefits 1s Ineligible 1f he or she was discharged from 
employment for "just cause or an act or omission 1n connection with employment 
which is deliberate, willful or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful 
Interest". In order to sustain a denial of unemployment insurance benefits, the 
employer must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant was "at 
fault" in causing his own unemployment. Such claimant fault must be demonstrated 
by evidence that the claimant had a degree of control, knowledge and culpability 
in the conduct resulting in discharge. Therefore, the claimant will not be denied 
unemployment benefits if discharged merely for inefficiency, inability, good faith 
errors in judgement or isolated acts of ordinary negligence. 
In this case, the claimant argues that the employer has not carried its burden of 
proof. It is noted that the employer's presentation is inadequate for its lack of 
specificity and documentation. For example, there is no clear record of prior 
instance of unexcused tardiness by the claimant or of prior warnings of potential 
discharge. Thus, the case factually hinges upon the claimant's possible fault for 
the absenteeism on December 9 and 10, 1984. 
That the claimant attempted to leave a telephonic message to his supervisor through 
a fellow employee early on December 9 is disputed by the parties, but even accepting 
the claimant's testimony, it is clear that: a) he understood that he was expected 
to report for work that day; b) he was expressly threatened with discharge one 
week earlier in the event he had been absent; c) the claimant had not previously 
requested or received permission to miss work on December 9; and d) he missed work 
solely to engage in personal activities, not because he was medically or otherwise 
Incapable of working. These factors, coupled with the employer's prior oral admoni-
tion to the claimant that his attendance was crucial to the company's operations, 
demonstrate that the claimant had the requisite knowledge of the employer's reason-
able expectations and control of the errant conduct which was exclusively withir 
his power to control or prevent. 
The claimant's absence on December 10 from work also demonstrates that the claimanl 
was at fault in causing his own discharge. Even assuming, as he has testified, 
that the claimant could not drive to work because of vehicular difficulties, he 
nonetheless failed to utilize the employer's prior offering of transportation t< 
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fork. Thus, the claimant consciously failed to adopt reasonable and available 
neasure to recognize the employer's legitimate interests and to preserve his own 
employment. The claimant's conduct and absenteeism on December 9 and 10, 1984 
reflect disregard of the employer's expectations and go beyond mere oversight, 
Inability or good faith error In judgement. Therefore, It is held that the employ-
er had just cause for the claimant's discharge within the meaning of §35-4-5(b)(l) 
Df the Utah Employment Security Act and that the claimant was properly denied 
unemployment Insurance benefits by the Department. 
DECISION: 
The Department's decision dated January 4, 1985, which denied unemployment insur-
ance benefits effective December 9, 1984, pursuant to §35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act 1s hereby affirmed. The claimant 1s denied benefits 
effective December 9, 1984 and continuing until he has provided services 1n new, 
bona fide covered employment and has earned wages equal to at least six times his 
weekly benefit amount of $186 and 1s otherwise eligible. 
Pursuant to the Utah Department of Employment Security Rules, Regulations and 
Guide to Adjudication, because the claimant has been found ineligible for unemploy-
ment insurance benefits under §35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act, 
the employer, Terminal Service Company, is eligible for relief of charges to its 
benefit ratio tax rate in connection with this claim. 
Administrative Law Judge^^ 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
This decision will become final unless within ten days from February 15, 1985, 
further written appeal is made to the Board of Review (P. 0. Box 11600, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84147) setting forth the grounds upon which the appeal 1s made. 
cd 
Attachment 
c: Terminal Service Company 
3900 N.W. Yeon Avenue 
Portland, OR 97210 
Tom Cantrell 
P. 0. Box 632 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
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The 9th, number 9. 
All right. 
And we ask that 1f an employee's not gonna be at work, he at least call us 
and let us know. We did not receive a phone call that Sunday, 1t was an 
unexcused absence. The following Monday, Rlcardo had his girlfriend 
call me the next morning and say that he would not be able to make 1t to 
work that day because his truck would not run. We had had talks with 
Rlcardo concerning this problem and had told him that 1f he couldn't make 
it to work because of his truck not running, that I would arrange to pick 
him up. It is yery important that our people be here, because we run 
almost like an assembly line. Other than illness, we didn't feel that 
there was any excuse. And he had been told several times that if he did 
not come to work, that we would eventually have to let him go, and that's 
what we had to do. 
Go ahead. 
I don't have anything else to say. 
All right, to sum up, as I understand your testimony, Mr. Crapo, the claim-
ant had been warned regarding potential discharge for nonappearance at 
work, I assume that includes tardiness. 
Yes, sir. 
He was scheduled to work on Sunday the 9th, is that correct? 
Yes. 
How was he informed that he was scheduled to work? 
Well, we work every Sunday and eyery employee works eyery Sunday. And they 
are told Friday night the time they are to come in on Sunday, rather it be 
7:00 in the morning or 8:00 in the morning. 
What time was the schedule, was the claimant scheduled to work on this par-
ticular Sunday morning? 
8:00. 
He failed to appear or otherwise communicate with the employer all day, 1s 
that correct? 
Yes. 
All right, he appeared for — well, he didn't, his girlfriend called the 
following day, is that correct? 
- 7 -
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CRAPO Right . 
JUDGE What happened then? 
CRAPO W e l l , and I , I d i d n ' t say anything to her . I j u s t s a i d , "Okay." And then 
the next morning when R1co, or Ricardo came to work I Informed him t h a t he 
had been te rmina ted . 
JUDGE That would have been Tuesday? 
CRAPO Tuesday morning. 
JUDGE Was he Issued a "Separation Notice?" 
CRAPO No, s i r , I don ' t think so. 
JUDGE All right, is there anything further that you'd Hke to add at this time, 
Mr. Crapo? 
CRAPO No, there Isn't . 
JUDGE Do you have any other witnesses that you want to have speak at this time? 
CRAPO Yes, I'd H k e to put Wally Bratton, he 1s the assistant manager, and he was 
the supervisor, Ricardo's supervisor that Sunday, the day that --
JUDGE All right, could you go ahead and put him on the line, then, please. 
CRAPO Uh huh. 
BRATTON Hello, this is Wally. 
JUDGE Mr. Bratton. 
BRATTON Uhmm. 
JUDGE Could you state your title, please, with the company? 
BRATTON I am considered the lead man. I am the work supervisor. 
JUDGE Let me administer the oath at this time. 
OATH ADMINISTERED. Mr. Bratton answered in the affirmative. 
JUDGE Thank you, were you the acting supervisor of Mr. Crapo at the time of his -
I'm sorry, of Mr. Burnside at the time of his termination from employment? 
BRATTON I was. 
- 8 -
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$ We just said, we l l , i f , i f his truck is broke down, we' l l be glad to come 
over and pick him up. 
Well, who made that statement to Mr. Burnside? 
N Just one minute. Hold on, please. (Pause) Pardon me. 
My question was, who made that statement to Mr. Burnside, that he could be 
furnished with transportation by the employer? 
N Ron, Ron Crapo. 
Al l r ight . 
LL You've indicated, i f I understood you correctly, you indicated ear l ie r on 
in your testimony that you had made an offer to go pick him up that morning 
when he called i n . 
N Pardon me. 
Can you hear, I ' l l have to ask — 
LL I'm sorry, I ' l l come closer. I'm sorry, Wally, just a second, l e t me check 
up here. I understood you to make the, make a comment of when his g i r l -
fr iend called in that you had offered to go, that you'd offered to go pick 
him up. 
>N No, see, I didn't , I didn't take that phone c a l l . Ron Crapo took that 
phone c a l l . I don't, I know what he did was he told Rico once before that 
any time that his truck, he did not have the transportation, that Ron would 
be glad to come, go over and pick him up. 
1L All r ight , I , I think I 've made the point, then. Boy, this is so damn con-
fusing I can't - -
I know, I agree. 
1L I can't believe this. Before it slips my mind, I want to raise an objec-
tion to the issue of the record. This is — I'm not addressing you, Wally, 
I'm addressing the hearing officer. And this is, again, one of the reasons 
why we did request the, the continuance. It seems like there's bits and 
there's pieces of information missing, that in the interest of all concerned, 
as far as interest of fairness and finding out what really did take place, 
as you've indicated that's the purpose of this thing. 
)N Yeah. 
ILL They're talking about a record that, that I , I can't see, we can't refer 
to, that they don't even have in their possession. I realize that you're 
- 11 -
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CANTRELL Okay, and it was -- okay, I'm getting it straight, now, and then it was on 
Monday that, that Don, that Ron — is it Don or Ron? 
BRATTON Ron. 
CANTRELL I t was that Sunday, then, tha t Ron was there that he reports tha t Burnside 
d i d n f t show up and d idn ' t c a l l , i s tha t — 
BRATTON No, no, Ron was here on Monday. 
CANTRELL Oh, is that right. 
BRATTON I 'm , I'm here on Sundays. 
CANTRELL Okay, a l l r i g h t . Now, I'm get t ing i t . So you' re saying tha t you got a 
c a l l - -
BRATTON No, Ron received the ca l l from Ricardo's g i r l f r i e n d on Monday. 
CANTRELL Okay, you were both there on Monday. 
BRATTON We were both here on Monday. 
CANTRELL Okay, and you were the only one there on Sunday? 
BRATTON Yes. 
CANTRELL Who, who terminated him? 
BRATTON The boss, Ron Crapo. 
CANTRELL Okay, I'm gonna have to ask him the question, then. Do you have, do you 
have a policy and procedure manual, anything in writing stating employee 
rules, times, those sorts of things. 
BRATTON No, we don't. We just have, pardon me, maybe Ron — Well, yeah, Earl was 
just telling me we do; but we do not have it here. It's in Portland where 
the main offices are. 
CANTRELL Oh. 
BRATTON But it's just a verbal understanding that we have with all our employees. 
CANTRELL Okay. Okay, so what I understand, then, is the verbal understanding as 
the employees work six days a week, that includes Sundays. Do they ever 
get a Sunday off? 
BRATTON Yes, uh huh. 
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LL What, what 1s the arrangement for that Sunday off? 
N If they, they can, any of the personnel can have a day 1f we are notified 
and they say, "Can I have certain day off?" And you say, "Well, fine, you 
bet." And we work around 1t that way. See, 1f, and he's had Sundays off 
and so has the other, you know, a lot of 'em have. And when this happens, 
we gear ourselves to, to handle 1t. 
Mr. Bratton, are you saying, then, that 1f an Individual requested a par-
ticular day off, they would have to obtain advance permission? 
IN Yes. 
Do you re-, do you stipulate how far, 1n advance of the day off requested, 
that permission should be obtained? 
IN We don't, but they, one day, you know, and we can, we can give for It. 
In other words 1f, 1f an Individual wants a Sunday off, they should ask 1t 
no later than the Immediately preceding Saturday. 
IN Friday. We do not work Saturdays. We work Fridays. 
All right, I see, so one, one working day In advance. 
IN Yes, uhmm. 
Now, 1s that rule based on an oral understanding or 1s 1t, again, communi-
cated to employees 1n writing? 
)N No, It's just a verbal understanding that we have. 
Anything further, Mr. Cantrell? 
XL Not right now. I need to ask Ron what ~ a couple of things that — 
Rlcardo, you had something you wanted to ask him? 
\H1 Yeah, just what he said about a — 1s that all right? 
Sure, go ahead. 
WT About the Sunday. When this happened last Sunday, I asked Ron for a day 
of f , okay. He told me I f I didn't come to work, then don't come back 
there any more. The same Sunday I came Into work, that Sunday another 
employee took the day off and was nothing said to that employee. Okay. 
And before when Bob asked him for a day off , as he said, you had to ask 
him for time two or three days ahead of time. The same thing was said, i f 
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JUDGE You' re saving you were the f111 -1n manager. 
CRAPO Yes, s i r . 
JUDGE And so - -
CANTRELL Okay. 
JUDGE — I think your, your f ind 1s tha t you were not aware of what the required 
personnel procedures were a t that t ime. 
CRAPO Exactly. 
JUDGE All right. 
CANTRELL Just out of curiosity, can you date or time any of the times that this, this 
claimant was supposed to been warned ab'out coming 1n late, or not coming fn, 
or that sort of thing. 
CRAPO The only way that I could do that is have copies of his time cards mailed 
down from Portland. 
JUDGE Well, would this — This is Mr. Hansen, would, would those time cards 
reflect when warnings were issued? 
CRAPO No, they wouldn't. 
CANTRELL Did you ever issue a warning in writing? 
CRAPO No, sir. 
CANTRELL Did you ever have a s i t u a t i o n where an employee would come i n w i thout c a l -
l i n g or d i d n ' t show up without c a l l i n g and he was not terminated? 
CRAPO Not to my r e c o l l e c t i o n . 
CANTRELL I s tha t r ight? (Whispering) 
So, i n other words, what you're t e l l i n g me is tha t anybody who has ever 
come in l a t e without ca l l ing 1n, or who has j u s t simply not shown up for 
work on a day, was terminated. 
CRAPO Not to my r e c o l l e c t i o n , however, you've got t o r e a l i z e I 'm an outs ide sales-
man and the two months t h a t I was here , no. However, Wally or Bob would 
be ab le to v e r i f y , yes , or , no, on t h e , on t h a t ques t ion . 
CANTRELL Okay. I d o n ' t have any f u r t h e r questions f o r him r i g h t now. 
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Mr, Crapo, on this Monday, the 10th, when the claimant's girlfriend called 
you. 
Yes. 
About what time of day was that? 
Oh, about 8:00 in the morning. 
And as I understand it, you, you spoke with her, is that correct? 
Correct. 
At that time, did you ask her if — I'm sorry. At that time, as I under-
stand it, you offered to provide transportation for the claimant to work. 
Is that correct? 
No. 
Pardon me. 
No, I did not, not at that time. I , when she called me, Ricardo doesn't, 
didn't have a phone at his house. When she called me, apparently she was 
at work and I just, I said, "Okay," and that was the end of the conversa-
tion. I didn't feel that i t was my place to discuss Ricardo's employment 
status with her. 
How did you know that she, or how did, why did you feel that she was at 
work? 
I , I didn't know. I know Ricardo doesn't have a phone and I just assumed 
that. I didn't have any idea where she was at. 
Did you ask her i f he was nearby, or available, or i f she could reach him, 
or — 
No. 
I think that there was some conflict here in the testimony. I believe that 
i t was Mr. Bratton who said that Mr. Ricardo, or Mr. Burnside through his 
girlfriend was offered a ride to work that day? 
No, and that was never — I had offered Ricardo, I told him before that i f 
he couldn't get to work because of his truck being broke down, that I'd be 
more than happy to pick him up, and I did on one occasion. 
All right, but no such offer was made on that particular day? 
No. 
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employee there. Okay, sometimes before when I called him, Wally wasn't 
no where around and Ron don't work on Sunday. And I told him that I , I 
couldn't make 1t 1n, 1t had to be about quarter to eight, and to give Wally 
a message. I wanted to speak to Wally. He said, "Wally s out of the yard." 
And he said, "Okay," and hung up. So, evidently he must have told Wally the 
message, he did t e l l Wally the message, and Wally would say this and hung up 
And the Monday, I was about to go to work. I dropped my g i r l f r iend off at 
work, my, my truck stopped 1n her work parking l o t , where she worked at , 
and I'm out there trying to get 1t started. I told her to go 1n there and 
call my job, t e l l Ron I would, you know, having truck problems. I'm trying 
to get 1t started, I would be 1n. I didn't get 1t started that day. I 
had to get 1t towed, you know, back to the house. I , you know, worked on 
1t a l l that day. I showed up for work Tuesday morning, okay. At this time, 
Tuesday morning, I got there about half an hour ear ly , 20 minutes early - -
JUDGE On Tuesday. 
CLAIMANT — real ly , I wasn't expecting to get f i red and that , because when I drove a 
car I n , I said, "Did he, did he say anything?" Oh, no, you know, he said, 
"No." When I got Into work Tuesday, he called me over — we l l , before he 
called me over I was talking with another employee that didn' t come to work 
Monday, okay, and he was te l l ing me that he didn't make 1t to work Monday 
and that, you know, and Brent was there and he said, "Well, I was really 
made 'cause he had to stay here a l l night." Kept him from work, you know. 
I said, "Well, I called 1n, I , you know, I had to , you know, I couldn't 
leave my truck there 'cause the guy who, the jani tor or something told me 
I would to move i t 'cause i t was blocking, I was just pull ing out when i t 
cut off . I t had a short in , in each side. I would have to move i t so I 
didn't want to try to get a ride to work and just leave my truck there, 
'cause I have before, I had to get i t towed. 
And I went to work Tuesday, and Ron called me 1n the off ice and told me 
that I was, he was gonna l e t me go and I could get 1n my black truck and, 
and get on (uninte l l ig ib le . ) And before I l e f t , I found out that , Brent 
was te l l ing me that, that he was really pissed off because I didn't show 
up, you know, but I did c a l l . There's another man there that didn' t , did 
not show up, you know, I don't know i f he called or what, you know. And I 
thought he was gonna f i r e him, too; but he didn't f i r e him. He didn't 
f i r e him, his name's Madison, Masterson (? ) . 
And as far as him talking about me being tardy a l l these times, when I f i rs t 
started working there, I was, you know, tardy, what the f i r s t — second week 
was, I dropped my gir l f r iend off at work. I talked, boss talked to me, the 
main manager, and I got that straightened out, you know. What he's talking 
about tardy now, I don't know what he's talking about. And what I don't 
understand is I pick my gi r l f r iend up from work at 4:15 eyery day. Ever 
since I've been, you know, start working, come this early. I don't leave 
there at 4:30, I'm there every, every day between 4:15 and 4:30, you know, 
- 20 -
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and, i f , 1f arything he's talking about tardies, i t ' s about me getting off 
work late. You never see i t on rqy paycheck, you know. Never see i t on my 
paycheck, you know. And i f I could stay there 20 minutes — 30 minutes and 
not get paid for i t , the few times that I was tardy when I f i rs t started 
working there, I don't, you know, he shouldn't have nothing to $ay9 really. (Unintelligible) 
And plenty of times I have asked for days off, he has, Ron told me the week 
before he fired me, i f I didn't come in, I can, just don't come back to 
work. Gene Demarest (?) did not show up, he didn't say nothing to him, 
not a thing. He didn't say nothing to him. And I can recall two or three 
times guys like this took off without even calling in . All the times I 
have been, you know, took off either over, usually over, you know, i f I'm, 
say I am going to be late, I would ca l l . But what I can't understand 
'cause this policy of, of two days I was off, you know, I don't see why 
John Madison didn't get fired either, you know. I , I believe i t ' s discrim-
ination and I've been looking for another job. 
I've been working there, going, almost a year — 10 months. And I've been 
looking for another job ever since I started working there, because I had 
a talk with the main manager, Bob, he asked me whether this was discrimin-
ation in there, and i t , and i t is, you know. And I'm the only black person 
that worked there. I had to do most of the work and everything, you know, 
things just wasn't right and I was looking for something like this to 
happen. And he did i t right before Christmas so I guess he would try to 
hurt me, I don't know. You know, that's, you know, that's why I'm here. 
(Unintelligible) 'Cause the work I did was excellent, and in two days, I 
feel that he should, he shouldn't have fired me for that, you know. I 
have stayed at least 30 days, 20 minutes to half an hour, or less, overtime, 
taken on account of sick, you know, that's why I'm here now. That's all I 
have to say. 
Did you specifically make a request to take off Sunday the 9th? 
No, I asked to take off the Sunday before, the Sunday before that. 
You did not request to take off the 9th? 
Urn urn. 
Why were you absent that day? 
The 9th? 
Yes. 
Okay, that's the day I was working on my truck. I was working on my truck 
Sunday, the 9th, okay, and Monday, what happened I just put a starter in 
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Sunday, okay. And Monday, I got up to take my girlfriend to work and 
started up --
JUDGE Okay, I understand that part, but I wasn't sure of the reason for your 
absence on the Sunday. You're saying, though, that on that Sunday you did 
call 1n, and you talked to Brent about 7:45 a.m.? 
CLAIMANT I talked to Brent. I don't know his last name. 
JUDGE And you asked him to leave a message for, for Wally, that you would not be -
CLAIMANT I told him I wanted to speak to Wally and he said, "Wally's 1n the yard/ 
And I said — 
JUDGE But then you asked to leave a message, correct? 
CLAIMANT What? 
JUDGE Tell him and he'd say he would give ~ 
CLAIMANT Before I asked him, I, I would tell Wally, I don't know. He promptly told 
Wally and Wally forgot, 1s what It was probably. 
JUDGE Do you recall being warned that 1f you failed to appear for work at the 
requested time — 
CLAIMANT No, no. 
JUDGE — that you'd be fired? 
CLAIMANT No. 
JUDGE Or that you could be fired? 
CLAIMANT No. 
JUDGE Do you recall anyone? 
CLAIMANT Just that when he said he would fire me that Sunday, and I came 1n that 
Sunday. 
JUDGE That was the 2nd, that was the Sunday before, right? 
CLAIMANT Yes, the Sunday before, right. That's why I wanted to take the Sunday off 
for to get my truck together. And — let me explain this to you, when I 
started working there, he said every person would have, you know, take a 
Sunday off every month, 'cause four people worked there. Each month we 
borrow Sundays, okay. This Sunday, I hadn't had one off 1n at least a 
month there. 
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ER (Inaudible - employer talking to someone 1n background) 
NT And I can recall at least three times, no, two times I have worked there 
with just me and another guy, you know, without two other people there. 
All right. 
NT L e t ' s see him make a statement tha t nobody, I haven' t took a day o f f without 
c a l l i n g 1n. Two times I have worked a l l Sunday, wi th j u s t me and another 
guy, with the other two people did not show up, did not c a l l 1n. 
So you ' re saying, b a s i c a l l y , you ' re saying I t ' s happened before . 
m Yes. 
With other people. 
MT Yes. 
And with you. 
WT No, not with me. 
Just with other people. 
\NT Just with other people. 
And they were not discharged? 
\NT Not discharged. 
How do you know that? 
\NT They're s t i l l working t h e r e , now. 
How do you know t h a t , t h a t ' s what I 'm asking? 
ANT How do I know, because - -
Have you ta lked to them, or do you see them a t work, or something? 
ANT Yes. 
Mr. Crapo, do you have any questions regarding Mr. Burnside's testimony? 
I don' t have any questions. Hold on a minute. (Pause) No, I don' t have 
any questions. 
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you should realize that 1f such an appeal 1s made, the Board will review 
the case solely on the case of a written transcript of this hearing, which 
1s now being recorded, and the documents 1n the file. There 1s no further 
1n-person hearing held after today, and with that 1n mind, I'd like to ask 
each of the parties now to make a brief closing statement, starting with 
you, Mr. Crapo. 
CRAPO Okay, the employee, Rlcardo, had, as I said, been warned several times 
about the failure to show to work for, to repair his pickup or saying that 
his pickup does not run because I had offered to bring him to work. To 
actually go and pick him up and bring him to work 1n order to enable us to 
run as we need to, to operate. After several warnings, and verbal warnings 
they are, he did not call 1n on the Sunday in question, and he had his girl 
friend call for him on the following Monday, and we would had no other 
choice but to terminate him at that time. 
JUDGE All right, anything further? 
CRAPO Not, no, I don't have anything. 
JUDGE All right. Mr. Cantrell. 
CANTRELL As I view this case and I'm reminded of the two, two, two things particu-
larly. One is the charge, here, has to do with his intent, the employee's 
intent. Willful and wanton, wanton is contrary to the employer's best 
Interest. The second issue has to do with the, with the type of evidence 
that has been presented, I think it's been fairly well evidenced that the 
employee, 1n this case, Rlcardo, has tried very hard to do, to do his job. 
He'd stay late, he'd done the things he was supposed to do* He, he follow* 
the policies the best he knew them. 
The policies in this case obviously haphazard or inconsistantly implied, 
on top of being unwritten. He worked there a year. He Indicated that, 
yes, he was in fact late minimally at the very couple of weeks in his 
employment. He talked to the man who was then the employer, Bob Johnson, 
got the situation straightened out and was not late since. We have no 
documentation, we have testimony which 1s conflicting as far as I'm con-
cerned and very ~ well, no, practically no documentation to, to support 
their claims. 
As I understand it, and as, of course, you indicated first, Mr. Hansen, th< 
preponderance of evidence issue, I think is very important in this case. 
Obviously, they have a disagreement. I think it's clear that the employee 
was not there on Sunday, but as to the Intent as to whether or not he 
followed the rules as to whether or not he acted contrary to the employer' 
best interest. I think it's very clear that he followed the rules effecti 
him and that he was conscious of the employer's best interests. 
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Ch. 20 UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION [1660] 
Discharge for Misconduct. 
(b) (1) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for just cause 
or for an act or omission in connection with employment, not constitut-
ing a crime, which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the 
employer's rightful interest, if so found by the commission, and thereafter 
until the claimant has earned an amount equal to at least six times the claim-
ant's weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered employment. 
(2) For the week in which he was discharged for dishonesty constituting 
a crime in connection with his work as shown by the facts together with his 
admission, or as shown by his conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction 
of a crime in connection with that dishonesty and for the 51 next following 
weeks, provided that when by reason of his alleged dishonesty in connection 
with his work, the individual is held in legal custody or is free on bail, any 
determination of his eligibility shall be held in abeyance pending his release 
or conviction. 
Failure to Apply for or Accept Work. 
(c) If the commission finds that the claimant has failed without good cause 
to properly apply for available suitable work, to accept a referral to suitable 
work offered by the employment office, or to accept suitable work offered by 
an employer or the employment office. The ineligibility continues until the 
claimant has performed services in bona fide covered employment and earned 
wages for the services in an amount equal to at least six times the claimant's 
weekly benefit amount; provided no claimant shall be ineligible for benefits 
for failure to apply, accept referral, or accept available suitable work under 
circumstances of such a nature that it would be contrary to equity and good 
conscience to impose a disqualification. 
The commission shall consider the purposes of this act, the reasonableness 
of the claimant's actions, and the extent to which the actions evidence a genu-
ine continuing attachment to the labor market in reaching a determination of 
whether the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and good con-
science. 
(1) In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual, 
the commission shall consider the degree of risk involved to his health, safety, 
and morals, his physical fitness and prior training, his prior earnings and 
experience, his length of unemployment and prospects for securing local work 
in his customary occupation, the wages for similar work in the locality, and 
the distance of the available work from his residence. 
Prior earnings shall be considered on the basis of all four quarters used in 
establishing eligibility and not just the earnings from the most recent 
employer. The commission shall be more prone to find work as suitable the 
longer the claimant has been unemployed and the less likely the prospects are 
to secure local work in his customary occupation. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, no work shall be 
deemed suitable, and benefits shall not be denied under this act to any other-
wise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the fol-
lowing conditions: (i) if the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, 
lockout or other labor dispute; (ii) if the wages, hours, or other conditions of 
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The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Department of Employment Security 
APPEALS SECTION 
DECISION OF APPEALS REFEREE 
James A. Januzik 
655 South Eighth East #1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
S.S.A. No. 389 50 3225 
Case No. 76-A-1872 
On June 1, 1976, the employer, University of Utah, filed a timely appeal from 
a decision of a Department Representative dated May 25, 1976, which allowed 
benefits to the claimant, James A. Januzik, on the grounds that he had been 
discharged by the University of Utah for reasons which were not disqualifying. 
The matter was received by the Appeals Section on June 4, 1976, and on June 23, 
1976, notices of the time and place of hearing were directed to the parties. 
The hearing was held in the office of the Appeals Referee at 1234 South Main in 
Salt Lake City on June 30, 1976, at the hour of 11:30 a.m. The claimant did 
not appear. Present for the employer was Mr. Fred F. Dremann, Attorney at Law. 
The hearing was initially scheduled for June 15, 1976, at the hour of 4:30 p.m., 
but was continued at the request of the employer. 
Based on the record and testimony pertinent to this matter, the Appeals Referee 
makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. That prior to filing a claim for unemployment compensation on May 18, 1976, 
the claimant had been employed as a janitor by the University of Utah from 
September 3, 1974, to May 4, 1976, working during evening hours. Monetary 
determination is $48.00 a week for twenty-eight weeks. 
2. That the claimant was absent from work April 27, 1976, and failed to call 
the employer to report his absence. On April 28, 1976, he called the employer 
informing him that he would be absent that day and requested also the following 
day off to take care of personal business. On Sunday, May 2, 1976, the employer 
completed an employee notice which was read and signed by the claimant on May 2, 
1976, and which states: 
James you have been absent many times during this last 
year. On several of these absences you have not called 
in to report your being off. You were told when hired 
that this is a must. Bobby Wood has told you repeatedly 
that you must call in when absent. 
I feel it is now time to put you on written notice. If 
you are late or absent one (1) time during the next t\*o (2) 
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months it will be an automatic termination. If you 
do come to work regular during this period of time 
and fail to call in when absent in the future it will 
be an automatic termination. 
3. That the claimant reported for work May 4, 1976. On the evening of May 5 
at approximately 11:00 p.m. the claimant called his supervisor to report that 
he would be one hour late. The claimant did not report at all for his shift of 
May 5, 1976, and \tfas discharged. A termination form was completed by the em-
ployer and signed by the claimant on May 5, 1976, which explained the reason 
for his termination. 
COMMENTS: 
Section 35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act provides: 
5. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or 
for purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
(b)(1) For the week in which he has been discharged 
for misconduct (not constituting a crime) connected 
with his work, if so found by the commission, and for 
not less than one or more than the nine next following 
weeks, as determined by the commission in each case 
according to the seriousness of the misconduct. 
Misconduct is generally conceived to mean an act of wanton or willful disregard 
of the employer's interests, a deliberate violation of the employerfs rules, or 
a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of 
his employees. The act or behavior of the employee must be within his control 
and must be motivated by an intent to inflict injury or damage on the employer, 
or it must be the result of a lack of concern with its possible adverse effect 
on the employer. Where there is absence of intent or lack of concern, the claim-
ant's act or behavior is not misconduct. (See 76 Am. Jur. 2d, Unemployment Com-
pensation, Sec. 52, Page 945.) 
In the instant case, it would appear that the claimant had been absent on several 
occasions without properly notifying the employer that he would be absent from 
work. The employer's request that claimant notify the employer when he expected 
to be absent from work is not an unreasonable one, and it would appear the em-
ployer has the right to be informed of such absences to allow him an opportunity 
to obtain a replacement or make arrangements necessary to accomplish the work 
within the allotted time. 
The record shows that, although the claimant did call at 11:00 p.m. on the even-
ing of May 5, he did so merely to report that he would be one hour late for work; 
instead, he failed to report for his shift at all. Having been cautioned on 
May 2, 1976, with respect to this matter, the claimant knew that failure to re-
port for work on May 5, 1976, would result in his discharge, and it is considered 
that the claimant's action demonstrated a disregard for the best interest of the 
employer as to constitute misconduct connected with his work. 
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CONCLUSION OF LAW: 
The Appeals Referee, therefore, finds: 
That the claimant was discharged by the University of Utah May 5, 1976, for 
misconduct connected with his work. 
DECISION: 
The decision of the Department Representative is reversed. Benefits are denied 
for the period May 2 through June 12, 1976. Any overpayment created by this 
disqualification may be offset by subsequent claims filed by the claimant during 
the current benefit year. 
See enclosed notice for right of further appeal. 
Dated this 2nd day of July, 1976. 
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